In Nead, the parties “unflinchingly appended a wealth of discovery materials to their respective moving papers, going far beyond the four corners of Nead’s complaint.” Thus, the Appellate Division considered the merits of the case under the summary judgment standard. On a different note, Nead also illustrates the principle of Rule 4:6-2 that when parties submit materials beyond the complaint on a Rule 4:6-2(e) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and the motion judge does not exclude those materials, the motion must be converted to a summary judgment motion under R. That court “was confronted with a complicated jurisprudential landscape littered with difficult legal principles, many dependent upon subtle principles of federal law.” In those circumstances, reconsideration, which resulted in the grant of summary judgment, “emblemized an attempt to further the interests of justice,” even though the Appellate Division ultimately reversed that summary judgment and reinstated the case. In Nead, the court stated, the Law Division was not wrong to reconsider its original ruling denying summary judgment. The Appellate Division observed that a motion for reconsideration is “after all, an inherent– as well as a rule-based– adjunct to the decisional process of dispute resolution,” and that courts “should not begrudge parties the right” to seek reconsideration.
Third, though many decisions have expressed unhappiness with motions for reconsideration, Nead makes clear that such motions are appropriate in proper circumstances. At its core, the guiding principle for all such reviews will always be the furtherance of the interests of justice.” This “uniform approach will also enhance predictability and serve to fortify our observance of precedent.” Thus, as a practical matter, it may not matter under which Rule reconsideration is sought, though the Court’s first lesson clarified that. Second, however, the court emphasized that “in order to maintain a consistent methodology for all motions seeking reconsideration, we believe that the same modes of thought and methods of analysis should apply to applications for reconsideration of both interlocutory ( Rule 4:42-2) and final ( Rule 4:49-2) orders. Now, it appears no longer to be necessary. This reliance on both Rules has occurred frequently. The plaintiff in Nead had invoked both Rule 1:7-4 and Rule 4:49-2, perhaps in an effort to ensure that no ground for reconsideration was overlooked. First, the decision clarifies that motions for reconsideration of interlocutory decisions are to be made under Rule 1:7-4, which in turn refers to Rule 4:42-2, rather than under Rule 4:49-2.
SAMPLE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION APPELLATE NJ TRIAL
This case, which resulted in a reversal of a trial court’s decision to dismiss an employment discrimination case, teaches several things about motions for reconsideration.